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In	 the	military	dimension	 the	 reform’s	objective	 is	 to	 create	




In	 the	social	 sphere	 the	reform	is	 intended	 to	provide	social	








ny’s	 interests.	 The	 participation	 in	 international	 operations	


















as	 the	spheres	of	 influence	of	 these	countries.	Germany	will	




•	 The	 premises	 of	 the	 Bundeswehr’s	 transformation	 and	 the	
evolution	of	Germany’s	security	policy	fit	in	with	the	existing	















































tions	 taking	place	 in	Europe:	 the	EU	and	NATO	are	undergoing	
changes	and	the	position	of	Germany	in	its	relations	with	its	allies	
























i. the Bundeswehr as a political 
instrument of Germany 
(1)	The	consent	expressed	by	the	US	and	their	European	allies	for	





forces	 were	 treated	 as	 an	 instrument	 of	 foreign	 policy,	 which	
helped	 to	 gradually	 increase	 the	 degree	 of	West	 Germany’s	 po-
litical	autonomy	with	regard	to	the	allies1.	However,	the	legacy	of	
World	War	II	weighed	heavily	on	the	West	German	armed	forces.	
Therefore	a	political	 and	 social	 concept	of	 the	Bundeswehr	was	





forces	 (intended	 to	 ultimately	 reach	 nearly	 half	 a	 million	 sol-





























legitimacy, i.e.	 the	acceptance	of	West	German	society,	 critical	









(2) the end of the cold war	brought	about	fundamental	chang-
es	 in	Germany’s	 foreign	 and	 security	 policy	which	were	 due	 to	
Germany’s	 reunification	 and	 regaining	 of	 full	 sovereignty	 and	
changes	in	the	security	environment.	Thus	the	German	govern-
ment	redefined	the	goals	and	principles	of	the	deployment	of	the	












the international acceptance of	 Germany’s	 military	 engage-
ment	 abroad	 has	 already	 partly	 existed.	 Due	 to	 Germany’s	 full	
integration	 in	 the	 EU	 and	NATO	 and	 the	 predictability	 of	 Ger-
man	policies,	above	all	the	US	began	even	to	expect	that	Germany,	
















which	 previously	 benefited	 from	 NATO’s	 protective	 umbrella,	
would	 fully	 participate	 in	 crisis	 management	 operations.	 The	
“multilateralism	 doctrine”	 in	 German	 security	 policy	 was	 also	
























































extended	 to	 Germany,	which	 has	 gradually	 been	 shifting	 away	
from	the	“multilateralism	doctrine”	to	conditional	support	for	ac-
tions	undertaken	by	its	allies	within	NATO,	the	EU	and	the	UN.	
Paradoxically,	 the	 emancipation	 of	 German	 security	 policy	 im-
plied	not	a	greater	autonomy	and	readiness	to	deploy	the	armed	
forces,	 but	 an	 increasingly	 cautious	 approach	 to	 participation	
in	 international	operations.	However,	unlike	 in	 the	 1990s	when	
arguments	 of	 a	 historical	 nature	were	 raised,	 national	 interest	
is	now	more	likely	to	be	the	determining	factor.	The	first	exam-



























The	 process	 of	 redefining	 the	 goals	 and	 principles	 of	 the	 Bun-
deswehr’s	deployment	abroad	started	alongside	Germany’s	grow-
ing	political	 independence	with	regard	to	 its	allies.	The	reform,	


























ii. the military dimension of the reform 
The	current	reform,	which	the	Federal	Ministry	of	Defence	refers	








Several	 years	 after	 the	 2003/2004	 reform	 authored	 by	 Peter	
Struck,	the	Defence	Minister	in	the	SPD/Greens	government	(see	
Appendix),	it	turned	out	that	the	structures	and	procedures	then	
introduced	 in	 the	 Bundeswehr	 did	 not	 take	 fully	 into	 account	
challenges	met	during	the	operation	in	Afghanistan.	The	internal	
report	prepared	by	the	Federal	Ministry	of	Defence	in	2007,	“The	




































to	 include	 in	 its	coalition	agreement	a	declaration	to	 implement	
the	consecutive	stage	of	the	transformation.	
An	 important	 incentive	 to	 introduce	 a	 deep	 reform	of	 the	Bun-
deswehr	was	provided	by	the	economic	crisis	and	the	four-year	
austerity	plan	of	the	federal	government	of	June	2010.	Under	this	
plan	 the	 Federal	Ministry	 of	Defence	was	 set	 to	 save	 8.3	 billion	
euros	 in	 total	 by	 2014.	 This	motivated	 the	ministry	 to	 consider	
a	 number	 of	 options	 and	 their	 possible	 implications	 for	 the	 ca-
pabilities	of	the	Bundeswehr.	Nevertheless,	despite	the	fact	that	
the	direct	incentive	to	implement	the	reform	was	the	search	for	

















the	 Bundeswehr	 (Bundeswehrverwaltung)	which	 performs	 functions	 re-

















from	 gradual	 decrease	 in	 German	 military	 involvement	 in	 Af-
ghanistan	(the	German	contingent	had	in	the	beginning	of	2012	
approximately	5,000	troops).		9				10						11







the forecasted budget of the federal ministry of defence  











9	 Data	 from	 the	 Federal	Ministry	 of	 Defence,	 Bundesministerium	 der	Ver-
teidigung,	www.bmvg.de
10	 Bundesfinanzministerium,	Unterrichtung	des	Bundes,	Finanzplan	des	Bundes	



















1. Improving expeditionary capabilities
In	 the	military	 dimension,	 the	 objective	 is	 to	 create	 a	military	
which	is	smaller	but	more	effective,	excellently	trained,	and	pro-
vided	with	modern	equipment.	The	changes	in	the	structure,	pro-
cesses,	 capabilities	 and	military	 equipment	 are	 geared	 towards	
improvements	 in	 the	 expeditionary	 profile	 of	 the	 Bundeswehr.	





















be	 diminished	 by	 approximately	 14%	 (to	 13,000	 soldiers)12.	 The	
Bundeswehr	 is	 to	 generate	 up	 to	 10,000	 troops	 to	 be	 deployed	
12	 The	 Joint	Medical	Service	will	have	 14,600	 soldiers	 (reduced	by	26%),	 the	
Joint	Support	Service	will	have	36,700	soldiers	(reduced	by	37%)	and	30,000	























The	 reduction	 in	 the	 number	 of	 soldiers	 has	 been	 linked	 with	































































concern	 Leopard	 2	 tanks	 (from	 350	 to	 225),	 Puma	 infantry	 fighting	 vehi-
cles	 (from	 the	 planned	 410	 to	 350),	 Panzerhaubitze	 2000	 self-propelled	
howitzers	(from	148	to	81),	NH90	medium	sized	transport	helicopter	(from	
the	planned	122	 to	80),	Tiger	multi-role	fire	support	helicopters	 (from	the	
planned	80	 to	40),	Tornado	combat	aircraft	 (from	185	 to	85),	probably	Eu-
rofighter	combat	aircraft	 (currently	the	Luftwaffe	has	143	Eurofighters,	 it	
has	not	yet	made	a	decision	about	accepting	the	delivery	of	37	Eurofighters	





17	 It	now	amounts	 to	23%	of	 the	Bundeswehr’s	budget.	Minister	de	Maizière	
billigt	Umrüstung,	21.10.2011,	www.bmvg.de	
18	 Niemieccy	 eksperci	 krytykują	 NH90,	 23.02.2010,	 http://www.altair.com.
















in the army the	strengthening	of	combat	capabilities	will	be	the	















Germany	 assesses	 that	 in	 the	 future	 the	 navy	 will	 be	 needed	
more	as	regards	 the	protection	of	German	citizens	and	German	
interests	 abroad	 and	 Germany’s	 participation	 in	 international	
joint	operations.	There	are	two	reasons	for	this.	The	protection	of	







21	 Germany	 is	 the	world’s	 third	 largest	 exporter.	 Furthermore,	 it	 is	 a	 coun-
try	 highly	 industrialised	 but	 poor	 in	 natural	 resources.	 The	 prerequisite	
for	exports	of	goods	and	imports	of	natural	resources	and	thus	also	for	the	
development	of	 the	German	economy	 is	well-functioning	global	 trade.	As	
maritime	 transport	 is	 one	 of	 the	 safest,	 cheapest	 and	most	 environmen-
tally-friendly	means	of	transportation,	it	is	of	strategic	significance	to	the	

































As	 for	 the	 German	 air force,	 the	 transformed	 Luftwaffe	 will	
maintain,	 though	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent,	 capabilities	 for	 the	 territo-
rial	defence	of	Germany	and	NATO.	The	air	force	will	retain	three	






in	 combined	 joint	 operations.	 Under	 the	Luftwaffe 2020 concept	
and	the	current	reform	the	air	force	will	also	prioritise	capabili-
ties	 that	 increase	 Germany’s	 political	 and	 military	 leverage	 in	
22	 In	approximately	2016	German	navy	will	have:	eleven	frigates	(four	state-






























Com	Bw2)	 and	 satellite	 reconnaissance	 systems	 (SAR-Lupe)	which	were	
launched	in	recent	years.	In	the	area	of	reconnaissance	and	communica-
tion	Germany	is	seeking	to	maintain	its	autonomous	capabilities	and	will	











ALTBMD	 (Active	 Layered	 Theatre	 Ballistic	 Missile	 Defence)	 programme	









the	US	decided	 to	withdraw	 from	 the	MEADS	programme,	Germany	also	
abandoned	it	on	financial	grounds.	
26	 Germany	will	be	developing	unmanned	aircraft	systems	which	are	already	






with	 foreign	 partners).	 It	 also	wants	 to	 develop	 its	 capabilities	 in	 higher	
class	HALE	UAVs.	From	2015	onwards	 the	Luftwaffe	will	have	 four	HALE	
class	 Eurohawk	UAVs	 equipped	with	 signals	 intelligence	 (SIGNIT)	which	
will	be	the	German	“ear”	in	the	air.	As	part	of	the	German	contribution	to	






























(1) Despite	 the	 introduction	 of	 financial	 and	 social	 incentives	
along	with	measures	 to	 increase	 the	 social	 recognition	 of	 serv-
ing	 in	 the	military,	 it	may	prove	difficult	 to	 recruit	 a	 sufficient	
number	 of	 volunteers	 (the	 expected	number	 ranges	 from	 5,000	
to	 15,000).	The	Bundeswehr’s	first	experiences	with	a	volunteer	
service	do	not	inspire	with	optimism	–	out	of	3,459	volunteers	en-















































several	 years	 will	 pass	 before	 this	 equipment	 will	 be	 commis-
sioned	into	service	with	the	German	armed	forces.	
(4) Even	 if	 the	Federal	Ministry	of	Defence	adopted	a	 long	 term	
budgetary	plan	(to	2015),	a	decrease	in	funds	allocated	to	the	re-
form	cannot	be	 ruled	out	 in	 the	coming	years.	The	government	
may	look	for	further	budget	savings	if	the	economic	and	financial	
crisis	in	the	EU	deteriorates.	Financial	setbacks	accompanied	by	
27	 Harald	Kujat, Das	Ende	 der	Wehrpflicht,	w:	Wehrpflicht	 und	Zivildienst,	
Aus	der	Politik	und	Zeitgeschichte,	48/2011,	November	2011,	pp.	3–7.






















a	 development	 depends	 on	 whether	 the	 German	 government	



















iii. the social dimension of the reform 




1. Problems with legitimacy
acquiring social legitimacy for	the	Bundeswehr’s	evolution	to-
wards	an	expeditionary	military	focused	on	conducting	interna-
tional	operations	has	been	the	greatest	challenge	for	the	German	








began	 to	 evolve	 towards	 a	 “friendly	 indifference”	 (freundliches	
Desinteresse)31.	At	the	same	time	society	was	sceptical	of	the	Bun-
deswehr	 taking	over	new	 tasks,	 and	Germany	used	 this	 fact	 in	
NATO	when	 justifying	 its	 lack	 of	 a	 larger	military	 involvement	






the	 last	 two	years	 the	Bundeswehr	has	had	 to	 substantially	ex-
tend	the	scope	of	operations	in	order	to	maintain	the	security	of	




















concerning	 the	Bundeswehr	 in	 the	 last	 20	years.	The	 air	 strike	
against	two	tanker	trucks	called	by	a	German	commander	in	Sep-
tember	2009	in	the	Afghan	province	of	Kunduz	claimed	the	lives	











The	 issue	 of	 the	 social	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 Bundeswehr	 as	 inter-
nationally	deployable	armed	forces	is	 indirectly	linked	with	the	
recruitment of volunteers and candidates for contract and 
professional soldiers. Until	 2011	 mandatory	 military	 service	
served	as	a	recruitment	system32.	Conscription	was	also,	at	least	in	
theory,	part	of	the	“citizen	in	uniform”	philosophy	and	the	“link”	
between	 the	 armed	 forces	 and	 society	which	 co-legitimised	 the	
32	 Mandatory	military	service	 fulfilled	 the	 function	of	 the	recruitment	sys-
tem	despite	the	diminishing	numbers	of	conscripts.	In	1990	the	percentage	
of	 conscripts	 in	 the	Bundeswehr	stood	at	45%,	 in	2010	 it	was	only	 15%.	 In	
recent	years	only	approximately	 17%	of	all	young	men	reaching	draftable	
age	served	in	the	military.	The	majority	performed	civilian	service,	often	
in	 social	 care	 institutions	 in	Germany,	 thus	 in	 fact	 providing	 them	with	
cheap	staff.	The	recruitment	role	of	conscription	started	to	generate	contro-
versies,	while	the	small	proportion	of	conscripts	provoked	questions	about	

























2. The new image and identity of the Bundeswehr 
In	order	to	provide	new	social	legitimacy,	the	Federal	Ministry	of	
Defence	has	 taken	measures	aimed	at	creating the new image 












33	 Besides	 the	 financial	 aspects	 and	 the	 possibility	 to	 receive	 high	 qual-
ity	education	in	the	Bundeswehr,	an	important	factor	in	(not)deciding	to	
join	the	armed	forces	–	particularly	in	Germany	–	is	also	the	social	aspect.	
See:	Heiko	Biehl	 /	Bastian	Giegerich	 /	Alexandra	 Jonas,	Aussetzung	der	
Wehrpflicht.	 Erfahrungen	 und	 Lehren	 westlicher	 Partnerstaaten,	 in:	
Wehrpflicht	und	Zivildienst,	Aus	der	Politik	und	Zeitgeschichte,	48/2011,	
November	2011,	pp.	31–38.
34	 The	 earlier	 traditions	 /	 events	 to	which	 the	German	armed	 forces	makes	


























ing	 to	 acknowledge	 the	 efforts	 of	 German	 soldiers	 involved	 in	
international	 operations	 and	 to	 commemorate	 those	 who	 were	





the	 catalogue	 of	 the	military	decorations	 of	 the	German	 armed	
forces.	This	 is	 the	first	decoration	of	 this	 type	 since	World	War	
II	 to	 be	 awarded	 by	 the	 Federal	Ministry	 of	 Defence	 to	 honour	
outstanding	 achievements	 of	 German	 soldiers	 in	 international	
operations37.	An	 important	signal	was	given	 in	April	2010	when	
Chancellor	Angela	Merkel	 for	 the	 first	 time	 participated	 in	 the	





between	 the	participation	of	 the	Bundeswehr	 in	 international	operations	
with	the	protection	of	Germany’s	economic	interests.	However,	in	autumn	
of	 the	 same	 year	 the	Defence	Minister,	 zu	Guttenberg,	 repeated	Köhler’s	
arguments.	See:	Anna	Kwiatkowska-Drożdż,	The natural	resources	deficit: 
the implications for German	politics,	OSW	Commentary,	February	2011.	























is	 intended	 to	 replace	 the	 integrating	 role	 formerly	 assigned	 to	
conscription	and	to	establish	the	“link”	between	the	professional	
armed	 forces	 and	 society.	 The	 civic	 duty	 dimension	 of	 the	 new	



















iV. the implications for nato and the eu
The	 foundations	 of	 the	 present	 reform	 along	with	 the	 develop-
ment	 of	 German	 security	 policy	will	 both	 influence	 Germany’s	
approach	to	political	and	military	cooperation	within	NATO	and	
the	EU.	
1. The implications for political cooperation within NATO 
and the EU 
The	current	Bundeswehr	reform	and	the	evolution	of	Germany’s	
security	 policy	 will	 bring	 about	 a	 progressing	 redefinition of 
Germany’s membership in nato and the eu.	Germany’s	mem-
bership	 in	NATO	 and	 its	 involvement	 in	 the	 Common	 Security	
and	Defence	Policy	are	unquestionable	in	Germany.	In	future	the	















engagement	 and	 thus	 influences	 the	 operation,	 or	 it	 opposes	 it	



























taking	part	 in	parallel	operations,	 the	predicted	duration	of	 the	
planned	operation	and	clear	conditions	for	its	completion	as	well	
as	the	possible	consequences	Germany	would	face	if	it	refused	to	

















the	 areas	 of	 diplomacy,	 development	 policy,	 political,	 economic	
and	financial	cooperation	as	well	as	police	and	military	coopera-
tion	are	sufficient	and	are	the	preferred	tools	of	protecting	Ger-
man	 interests.	 For	 these	 reasons,	 in	 future	 crises	 and	 conflicts	




























2. The implications for military cooperation within NATO 
and the EU 
With	an	evolving	approach	to	political	cooperation,	the	German	
take	 on	 the	 objectives	 and	 principles	 of	military	 cooperation	 is	
also	changing,	also	in	the	context	of	the	discussion	on	strength-
ening	military	cooperation	within	NATO	and	the	EU.
Germany will not be ready to become involved in cooperation 
which could result in a permanent interdependence between 
partners with regard to capabilities used in international 
operations. This	applies	above	all	to	units	of	the	army,	air	force	
and	 the	 navy	 conducting	 combat	 operations.	 Germany	 is	 con-
cerned	that	interdependence	in	such	capabilities	shared	with	its	





































Germany will however take part in projects of (limited) co­
operation which do not restrict Germany’s ability to act au­
tonomously and flexibly and which generate military and 














unit	 operation	 in	Afghanistan.	 See:	 The	German	mission	 in	Afghanistan	
depends	on	local	elections,	BEST	OSW,	19.01.2011,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/
sites/default/files/CEWEEKLY_99.pdf	






































47	 The	Ghent	 Initiative.	 In	 the	document	 submitted	by	German	and	Sweden	
in	November	2010	three	categories	of	capabilities	were	specified:	(1)	capa-




can	 extend	 as	 far	 as	 to	 increasing	 interoperability;	 (2) capabilities	 and	




In	 the	 latter	 area	 the	Bundeswehr	 is	 currently	 taking	part	 in	 the	 follow-
ing	initiatives:	the	NATO	Strategic	Airlift	Capability	and	the	European	Air	
Transport	Fleet);	(3) capabilities and support structures where mutual 
dependency and reliance upon european partners is acceptable in the 










































Text completed February 2012
48	 Julian	 Hale,	 Germany	 to	 press	 maritime	 patrol	 aircraft	 pool,	 29.07.2011,	
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20110729/DEFSECT05/107290307/	
Germany-to-Press-Maritime-Patrol-Aircraft-Pool	

















the most important reforms of the Bundeswehr 
and their context (1990–2004)
1. 1993: Volker Rühe’s reform
After	 Germany’s	 reunification	 the	 Bundeswehr	 started	 to	 par-
ticipate	 in	UN,	NATO	 and	WEU	 (Western	 European	Union)	 op-
erations.	 As	 early	 as	 in	 1991	 Germany	 supported	 the	militarily	




operation	 in	 Somalia	 (UNOSOM,	 logistics	 units).	Next,	German	
military	engagement	abroad	was	extended	to	the	participation	of	



































main	 defence	 forces	 (Hauptverteidigungskräfte),	 crisis	 response	
forces	 (Krisenreaktionskräfte,	 approx.	 50,000	 soldiers)	 and	 basic	
military	organisation	(Grundorganisation	der	Streitkräfte)50.	The	to-
tal	number	of	troops	was	to	reach	370,000	in	1995.	The	Bundeswehr	
thus	 began	 to	 have	 a	 certain	 double	 structure.	 The	main	 body	 of	
the	army	was	made	up	of	main	defence	forces,	based	on	mandatory	





















51	 Heiko	 Biehl,	 Die	 neue	 Bundeswehr,	 SOWI-Arbeitspapier,	 Nr.	 112,	 August	
1998,	pp.	23.
































geographically	 for	 Germany	 not	 to	 engage	 in	 their	 stabilisation,	
both	politically	and	militarily.	The	Bundeswehr’s	participation	in	
operations	 in	 the	 former	 Yugoslavia	 was	 to	 become	 a	 milestone	
for	the	German	military	out-of-area	engagement	and	contributed	
to	 breaking	many	 taboos.	 In	 1995	 the	German	units	 participated	
in	NATO’s	 IFOR	operation	 and	were	 stationed	 in	Croatia.	 “Kohl’s	
doctrine”	was	binding	and	according	to	it	German	soldiers	should	
not	 take	part	 in	operations	 in	countries	which	were	occupied	by	
the	 Third	 Reich	 during	World	War	 II.	 However,	 already	 in	 1996	
the	German	contingent	was	moved	from	Croatia	to	Bosnia	as	part	
of	NATO’s	SFOR	operation	which	replaced	IFOR.	Emphasising	the	
peace	 and	 stabilising	 character	 of	 the	 SFOR	 operation,	 in	which	
German	soldiers	were	assigned	mainly	logistic	and	medical	tasks,	
54	 „The development of the eastern German federal states is a priority for the Ger-
man government and will consume significant funds in the immediate future. The 
politico-economic concept of Germany’s security must take into account not only 




































ture.	 Organisationally	 the	 Bundeswehr	 was	 not	 well	 prepared	
for	 the	planned	development	of	military	capabilities	within	 the	
EU’s	European	Security	and	Defence	Policy	created	at	the	end	of	
the	 1990s.	 In	 1999	 the	SPD/Greens	government	decided	 to	carry	
out	 a	new	 reform.	The	 assumptions	 of	Defence	Minister	Rudolf	







sation,	 105,000	 soldiers)	 and	 operational	 forces	 (Einsatzkräfte,	
150,000	soldiers)	which	were	both	to	serve	for	territorial	defence	
and	 to	 be	 deployed	 in	 international	 operations56.	 Furthermore,	
56	 Hans-Dieter	 Lemke,	 Bundeswehrreform.	 Schwachpunkt	Krisenfähigkeit,	
















the	 Central	 Medical	 Service	 (Sanitätsdienst)	 and	 Joint	 Support	
Service	 (Streitkräftebasis)	 were	 created,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 Armed	
Forces	 Operational	 Command	 (Einsatzführungskommando)	 to	
run	operations	abroad.	








a	 new	 Defence	 Policy	 Guidelines	 (VPR)	 and	 in	 2004	 issued	 the	
new	Concept	of	the	Bundeswehr	based	on	the	Guidelines.	In	both	
documents	 the	 Federal	Ministry	 of	Defence	 proclaimed	 a	radi­




against	 unconventional	 threats	 such	 as	 international	 terrorism	





regions”57.	The	decision	about	 the	reform	was	 influenced	by	 the	































policy.	 The	 capabilities,	 structure	 and	 the	 number	 of	 troops	 of	





soldiers	was	made	 (up	 to	 195,000	professional	 and	 contract	 sol-




military	 service	 was	 reduced	 from	 ten	 to	 nine	months.	 A	 new	
categorisation	of	the	armed	forces	was	introduced.	The	new	cat-
egories	were	related	exclusively	to	the	ability	of	performing	tasks	
in	 international	 operations.	 A	 division	 was	 made	 into:	 the	 re-




ing,	 the	 support	 forces	 (Unterstützungskräfte,	 approx.	 147,000	
soldiers)	 for	 logistic,	 organisational	 and	 technical	 support,	 for	
command	and	control	in	international	operations	and	for	main-
taining	Bundeswehr	 infrastructure	 in	Germany.	 Emphasis	was	
placed	on	the	development	of	the	capabilities	required	to	conduct	





















Scharping/Kujat	 reform,	 the	 Response	 Forces	 Operations	 Com-
mand	and	 the	Special	 Forces	Operations	Command	were	 estab-
lished.
